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INTRODUCTION
Since their inception, the European Communities have focused not only on
building economic ties between their Member States, but also between the Member
States and the outside world as a means of achieving credibility and prominence.
Unfortunately, economic achievements, such as the common market and the single
currency, have not been paralleled by political achievements in the relations
between the Communities and the rest of the world. For example, the European
Union (Union) is a major contributor of international development and humani-
tarian aid throughout the Middle East, the former Soviet Union, Central and
Eastern Europe, and numerous developing countries. To date, however, Europe's
monetary contributions have not been matched by political action in the form of
peacekeeping or the promotion of human rights and democratic principles, as
Europe lacks a comprehensive and cohesive foreign policy. If it intends to become
a leading force in international affairs, the European Union needs to complement
its economic world influence with an effective security capability.'
After the end of the Cold War, the risk of war in Europe lessened, but long
simmering regional conflicts re-surfaced. The Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP) of the European Union aims to unite the Member States with the
hope of better enabling the Union to address new security challenges. The CFSP
touches on the heart of national sovereignty because its goal is the unification of
European foreign policy. There is much debate on how much, if any, sovereignty
the Member States have handed over to the European Community for matters
falling under the European Community Treaty. However, there can be little doubt
that foreign policy, and in particular defense policy, pinpoints even more centrally
the core of a nation's concept of control. This "Europeanization of a core area of
national sovereignty" is a necessary consequence if the Union wants an effective
common front on the international scene.'
The focus of this article is whether it is realistic to expect the Union to be an
effective international actor in the field of foreign and security policy. More
specifically, does it have the necessary tools, such as a workable institutional struc-
ture and an effective decision making process, to become a major player in global
security issues? As most of the Member States are members of the North Atlantic
See generally, The Council of the European Union and the Common Foreign and
Security Policy, at http://ue.eu.int/pesc/ [hereinafter CFSPwebsite] (last visited Jul. 10,
2001).
2 Dr. Javier Solana, Speech on The Development of a Common European Security and
Defense Policy- the Integration Project of the Next Decade, Berlin, (Dec. 17 1999),
at http://ue.eu.int/newsroom.
Uwe Schmalz, The Amsterdam Provisions on External Coherence: Bridging the Union 's
Foreign Policy Dualism?, 3 EFA REv. 421, 422 (1998).
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Treaty Organization (NATO),4 comparing decision making procedures within both
frameworks is instructive on how effective a collection of states can be in the
international arena. The Union will be successful in its Common Foreign and
Security Policy only if it has the ability, both practically and politically, to accom-
plish its goals. And, if the Union can execute a unified defense policy, it must then
re-think its role within, and possibly separate from, NATO.
I. ORIGINS OF THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY
A. European Political Cooperation
For decades the Member States of the Community have cooperated in foreign
policy, even beyond the scope of the Community Treaties. In 1970, six Member
States established through the Luxembourg Report the European Political
Cooperation (EPC), which was then formally adopted by the foreign ministers in
the European Council. The EPC was purely an intergovernmental process through
which the Member States agreed to cooperate in the field of foreign policy by
consulting each other regularly and, when possible, harmonizing their views and
instituting joint actions. As an intergovernmental process, the EPC took place
entirely outside the Community institutions and was intended to unify Europe
politically, as distinct from economic unification. Indeed, the subject matter of the
EPC was beyond the scope of the Community treaties and, therefore, outside the
jurisdiction of the Community institutions.5 Throughout the years it achieved
agreed declarations of policy, common negotiating positions, coordination at
international conferences, some common actions, and cooperation on the ground
between Member States in their various overseas missions. The overall purpose of
the EPC was to maximize the influence of the Member States on the international
scene. The Member States believed that they could be more influential if viewed
as a bloc.
The EPC evolved from a vacuum and a perceived need for European unity in
foreign affairs. The Treaty of Rome, which formed the European Economic
Community in 1958, did not entertain foreign policy ambitions. Its focus on
economic policy was considered "low politics," leaving the "high politics" of
foreign policy, which symbolized the core of national sovereignty, to loose forms
of coordination through intergovernmental consultation within the framework of
the EPC.6 By creating these discrete camps, the Member States intentionally and
strictly separated the low politics of economics from the high politics of foreign
NATO currently has nineteen member countries. Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France,
Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom
and the United States founded NATO in April 1949. Greece and Turkey joined in
1952, the Federal Republic of Germany joined in 1955, Spain joined in 1982, and the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined in 1999.
5 T. C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN CoMMUNITY LAW 24 (4th ed. 1998).
6 Schmalz, supra note 3, at 422.
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policy. As the EPC developed, however, the European Council became more in-
volved, causing the line between the EPC and the Community to fade. The dividing
line blurred further when the EPC attempted to control a third state's activities by
imposing economic sanctions.' The Member States quickly realized that to be a
truly international actor, there would have to be closer ties between their economic
and political external policies.'
B. The Single European Act
In 1986, under the Single European Act (SEA), the EPC acquired a treaty
foundation.' In Title III, the SEA set out the framework for the EPC and thereafter
the Member States coordinated their foreign policy within the parameters of the
SEA. The broad scope of the EPC, stated as "any foreign policy matter of general
interest"' made this task easier. The EPC was never intended to be the basis for
autonomous action; rather, the Member States would execute EPC action as a
"cohesive force."' '
The SEA, while providing a treaty basis for the EPC, did little more than
codify the existing, dualist practice. " Rather than attempting to unite foreign policy
and economic goals, the SEA created separate titles to govern each subject, thus
emphasizing the intergovernmental nature of Title III. Although the SEA imposed
new obligations on the Member States to inform and consult each other on foreign
policy matters, in practice the commitments were weak.' 3 As before, common
positions were products of consensus of which Member States were only required
to take "full account." So that there was some awareness between the Member
States' foreign and economic policies, the SEA required that Community external
policies and EPC policies be consistent.
In spite of the voluminous criticism, the SEA successfully involved the
Community institutions in the EPC process directly. For example, the Commission
was charged with ensuring consistency between foreign and economic policy. The
SEA also directly associated the European Parliament with the affairs of the EPC.
The problem was, however, that none of the other Community institutions had any
power in the EPC process. In sum, the SEA aligned Community and EPC processes
without transferring any significant power over foreign affairs from the Member
7 HARTLEY, supra note 5, at 24.
Schmalz, supra note 3, at 422.
SINGLE EUROPEANACT, Jul. 1, 1987, O.J. (L 169) 1 (1997) [hereinafter SEA], Title Ill,
art. 30 (1986).
10 Id. at art. 30(2)(a).
1 Marise Cremona, The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union
and the External Relations Powers of the European Community, in LEGAL ISSUES OF
THE MAASTRICHT TREATY 251 (O'Keeffe & Twomey eds., 1994).
12 Schmalz, supra note 3, at 423.
13 Eileen Denza, Groping Towards Europe's Foreign Policy, in INSTITUTIONAL DYNAM-
ICS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 578 (Curtain & Heukels eds. 1994).
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States to the Community institutions. In effect, it only added structure to an
entrenched pattern of diplomatic dialogue.
II. THE CFSP: HOW IT WORKS
A. The Three Pillars
On November 1, 1993, the Maastricht Treaty, known as the Treaty on
European Union (TEU), created the European Union. 4 The Union is composed of
three pillars, the first of which includes the European Community, the European
Coal and Steel Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. Title V
of the TEU covers provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy, also
known as the Second Pillar, and replaces Title III of the SEA. 5 In effect, Title V
absorbed the EPC. Title VI of the TEU covers provisions on police and judicial
cooperation in criminal matters, known as the Third Pillar.
The Member States' idea that there could ever be a truly common foreign
policy may have been an aspiration backed by desire rather than genuine intent.
Unlike the First Pillar, the Second and Third Pillars are essentially formalized
intergovernmental cooperation, as was the original EPC. Critics argue that although
the CFSP boasts a modified institutional and legal framework, it still lacks aptitude
for impact due to the reality that the success of the CFSP is totally dependent on the
political will of the individual Member States 6 because they refused to grant the
CFSP the supranational status held exclusively by the Community. 7 In fact, it was
important to the Member States that their ability to conduct national defense
remained largely unchanged." Thus, similar to the structure ofthe EPC framework,
the Community and the CFSP exist as wholly independent actors, although within
a common legal framework. Some argue that because the CFSP is inter-
governmental, it is nothing more than another rhetoric filled codification of the
EPC with an equally dim prospect for effective action.
Even accepting that the CFSP was largely a codification of EPC practice, 9 it
still introduced important changes. Overall, Title V of the Treaty on European
Union sets out a more developed framework that reaches a wider scope of issues.
Additionally, unlike the EPC, the Title V lays the foundation for autonomous
Union action, as opposed to action by the Member States individually. 0 The fact
'4 TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Nov. 1, 1993, O.J. (C 191) 1 (1992) [hereinafter TEU].
Is Article 50(2) TEU repealed Title III of the SEA and replaced it with Title V of the
TEU.
'6 Florika Fink-Hooijer, The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European
Union, 5 EJIL 173 (1994).
17 Schmalz, supra note 3, at 421.
Is CFSP website, supra note 1.
'9 M. R. Eaton, Common Foreign and Security Policy, in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE
MAASTRICHT TREATY 215 (O'Keeffe & Twomey eds., 1994).
20 Cremona, supra note 1I, at 251-52.
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that the EPC evolved into the CFSP shows that there was a shift in the Member
States' emphasis on national control to one of "Europeanization." 2' While the
Member States were not ready to fully integrate their foreign policies, they were
willing to align them more closely. Through the CFSP, the Member States have the
capability to speak with one voice on foreign policy and security issues, which
should enable the Union to acquire greater international influence.' 2
B. The Institutional Actors
As the Common Foreign and Security Policy evolves, its methods of imple-
mentation develop in tandem. Under Article 23 of the Treaty on European Union,
the three pillars share a common institutional framework that is designed to "ensure
the consistency and continuity of the activities carried out in order to attain its
objectives."23 The CFSP, however, is not implemented in the same way as other
Community policies, such as agriculture or environmental protection. Because
foreign policy and security go to the heart of a nation's sovereignty, the Member
States purposely restricted the powers of some Community institutions, as
discussed below. Additionally, the Union must implement the CFSP with specific
instruments, as opposed to the more general legal instruments, like directives and
regulations, available for other Community policies. The European Council, which
is not a Community institution,2" is composed of the heads of state or government
of the Member States and the President of the Commission. Acting by consensus,
it defines the "principles and general guidelines" and devises common strategies
for the CFSP, including defense related matters.25 As a non-Community institution,
the European Council is removed from the daily activities of the Union; however,
its lofty composition ensures that the political direction and decision making
leadership of the CFSP comes from the highest levels of government in each
Member State.
Although the Council of the European Union (Council) acts under the overall
direction of the European Council, the Council itself is responsible for the daily
operations of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. It is empowered to define
and implement the CFSP through common positions and joint actions and to
recommend common strategies to the European Council.26 It also has the duty to
ensure the "unity, consistency and effectiveness" of action by the Union. The
21 Schmalz, supra note 3, at 424.
22 CFSP website, supra note 1.
23 This article will use the new treaty numbering that came into effect on May 1, 1999 with
the Treaty of Amsterdam. All Treaty references are to the Treaty on European Union,
unless otherwise noted.
24 The European Council was created in 1974, but the TEU was the first treaty to describe
its role and define its official function within the European Union.
25 TEU art. 13.
26 Id.
27 Id.
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Commission's role is limited, but strong. It must be "fully associated" with the
operation of the CFSP,2  has a right of initiative equal to the Member States 9 and
is a permanent member of the rotating Troika,30 making it well-positioned to ensure
consistency between the Union's three pillars. Specifically, the Commission must
ensure that the CFSP policies are consistent with Community external economic
relations and development cooperation.3 Finally, the European Parliament has only
limited involvement in the CFSP. The Presidency must keep the Parliament in-
formed about CFSP matters and must consult it on basic CFSP policy choices.32
Parliament does not have, however, a formal right to be consulted before the Union
takes CFSP decisions, nor does it have any control over the Western European
Union (WEU), the defense body that brings together the European members of
NATO.3 Parliament's main avenue for participation is through making non-
binding recommendations to the Council. Such a limited role for the Parliament has
invited the well-worn criticism of the Union generally that the CFSP also suffers
from a democratic deficit.34
It is important to note that the institutions' competencies will vary considerably
depending on the pillar under which their powers are exercised.33 As an extra mea-
sure of caution, Article 47 anticipates a possible overlap between the CFSP and the
powers and activities of the Communities and, in effect, protects the Communities
from CFSP encroachment. Although the European Court of Justice has no general
jurisdiction over the Second or Third Pillar, it does have jurisdiction to determine
the dividing line between the pillars.36
The Presidency 1 represents the Union in all matters coming within the wide
parameters of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The president is responsible
for implementing CFSP decisions and representing the Union in international fora.
Under the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Presidency is assisted by the Secretary General
of the Council, who for purposes of CFSP matters is called the High Representative
and is supposed to improve the Union's external representation. By assigning the
28 TEU art. 18.
29 Under Article 14 TEU, the Council may request the Commission to submit proposals
concerning the CFSP and its implementation. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the
Commission's right of initiative under the CFSP is not exclusive, as it is generally with
other Community policies.
30 The Troika includes the Presidency, the High Representative and the Commission.
31 CFSP website, supra note 1, § Ill.
32 TEU art. 21.
33 Nanette Neuwahl, Foreign and Security Policy and the Implementation ofthe Require-
ment of Consistency under the Treaty on European Union, in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE
MAASTICHT TREATY 227, 243 (O'Keeffe & Twomey eds., 1994).
34 Fink-Hooijer, supra note 16, at 192.
35 TEU art. 5.
36 Article 46 excludes the European Court of Justice from jurisdiction over the CFSP but
expressly gives it jurisdiction over Article 47.
37 The "Presidency" is the current Member State holding the Presidency of the Council.
The Presidency rotates every six months.
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Presidency such a pre-eminent role in the CFSP, the Member States hoped to increase
the visibility of the Union on the international scene."i However, because the Presi-
dency rotates every six months, some have concluded that the transient leadership
could, at a minimum, confuse third countries."
The role of the High Representative should ease some of this concern, given
that the position is relatively constant and the High Representative is one of two
institutions in the Troika that is a permanent member. The tasks of the High
Representative include assisting the Presidency in representing the Union in CFSP
matters, implementing common measures and assisting the Council in all CFSP
matters." The High Representative, while being involved in internal CFSP policy
making, is primarily responsible for representing the Union in its foreign policy
relations with third countries.4' It is hoped, therefore, that the High Representative
will both improve the international visibility of the Union and enhance the
continuity and coherence of the Union's contacts with third countries. The success
of this office, however, depends largely on the willingness of the Member States
to support it, as well as the status and skills of the person appointed. The Union
assigned the office of High Representative serious credibility by appointing Javier
Solana, the former Secretary General of NATO, to the job in an effort to amplify
Europe's voice on world foreign policy and security issues.42
C. The Purpose and Scope of the CFSP
The scope of the CFSP is extremely broad as it includes "all areas of foreign
and security policy"4 and "questions relating to the security of the Union, in-
cluding the progressive framing of a common defense policy ... which might lead
to a common defense, should the European Council so decide."44 Because the
potential scope is so broad, the precise objectives of the CFSP are likely to evolve
over time as the Member States better define what it is they hope to achieve
through the CFSP 5 At the same time, however, the breadth of scope will likely
give rise to legal base and competency questions, as the Community institutions
must act within the defined limits of the treaty under which they are operating; i.e.,
38 Schmalz, supra note 3, at 433.
39 Fink-Hooijer, supra note 16, at 187.
40 TEU arts. 18(3), 26.
41 J6rg Monar, The European Union's Foreign Affairs System after the Treaty ofAnster-
dan: A 'Strengthened Capacity for External Action'?, 2 EFA REV 413, 424 (1997).
42 CFSP website, supra note I, § Ill.
43 TEU art. 1I.
44 TEU art. 17.
45 While beyond the scope of this article, it is important to note that European security
issues are also addressed by economic sanctions under the First Pillar, various trade
alliances such as the World Trade Organization, and the accession agreements between
the Union and candidate Member States.
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the European Community Treaty or the Treaty on European Union." This could
lead to a rise in inter-institutional conflicts,"' which could consequentially diminish
the overall effectiveness of the Union on the international stage.
One of the main purposes of the CFSP is to enable the Union to speak with one
voice on foreign affairs and security matters with the idea being that it could more
effectively create and maintain a stable international security environment. Article
17 addresses security as an issue separate from other areas of foreign policy. At the
Treaty's creation, the Member States were sharply divided on the extent the Treaty
should govern security.48 The final language is weak regarding the implementation
of an effective international security policy. Article 17 states that there is to be a
"progressive" framing of a common defense policy which "might lead to a com-
mon defense, should the European Council so decide [emphasis added]."'49 Further-
more, if the European Council did so decide, the Member States would then have
to adopt and ratify that decision according to their respective constitutional
requirements-a process which is not only long, but also politically difficult.
It is important to note that it is the WEU, and not the Member States acting
under the Treaty on European Union, that elaborates and implements the Union's
decisions and actions which have defense implications.' Article 17 states that the
WEU is an "integral part of the development of the Union providing the Union
with access to an operational capability..." and furthermore, that the "Union shall
foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of
the integration of the WEU into the European Union, should the European Council
so decide."'" This will require close cooperation between the WEU and the Union
and illustrates that the WEU could, in the long term, be responsible for organizing
a continent-wide defense policy. The Treaty language suggests that the ultimate
objective is to develop the WEU as the Union's defense component to strengthen
the European element of the NATO Alliance.52 As a safeguard measure, the Treaty
also states that the CFSP must be compatible with NATO policy and its actions
must not interfere with Member State obligations under NATO.53
While the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy under the
Treaty on European Union was intended to project the Union on the international
scene, the end results were not satisfactory to the Member States. At the 1996
Intergovernmental Conference, the Member States empowered the Union with the
" Schmalz, supra note 3, at 427.
47 Cremona, supra note 1, at 248; This problem is exacerbated by the limited jurisdiction
of the European Court of Justice under the Second Pillar.
48 Eaton, supra note 19, at 219.
49 TEU art. 17; Neuwahl, supra note 33, at 232.
so TEU art. 17.
51 TEU art. 17.
52 Fink-Hooijer, supra note 16, at 195.
53 TEU art. 17; One could argue that this safeguard measure flatly prohibits the formation
of a common defense policy altogether. See Neuwahl, supra note 33, at 232.
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capability to take more efficient and effective external action. 4 Indeed, the
European Council identified the need for CFSP reform as one of three primary
mandates of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference." The resulting Treaty of
Amsterdam amended and reconfigured the Treaty on European Union. The
majority of the changes to the CFSP introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam con-
cern decision making procedures, which are discussed below.
III. COLLECTIVE DEFENSE IN THE UNION
Due to implications on national sovereignty, collective defense is a volatile
issue in the European Union. Therefore, it is helpful to examine these issues closely
before asking whether the Union has the ability to effectuate its Common Foreign
and Security Policy. The methods the Union uses to implement its CFSP decisions
reflect issues unique to the practice of collective defense.
Before the Treaty on European Union, defense was outside the parameters of
European Community activity. As many of the Member States are also NATO
members, each Member State addressed its own security through national programs
or under the NATO umbrella. The 1990s marked a new era for European security,
as the European members ofNATO sought to increase their involvement in NATO.
Essentially, Europe wanted to exercise more influence, power and control within
NATO. This idea was first given legitimacy through the creation of the Common
Foreign and Security Policy under the Treaty on European Union and later through
the concept of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI).
New ideas, however, can generate fear. Because defense is so central to a na-
tion's sovereignty, the idea of a European collective security, under the guise of the
Union, has unleashed concern among several Member States. In 1992, Denmark
issued a declaration at the Edinburgh European Council that it would not develop
or implement Union decisions and actions that had defense implications. This
resulted from the Danish referenda on whether Denmark should accede to the
Treaty on European Union. Denmark consequently renounced its rights to exercise
the role of Presidency for defense related matters. The Union's understandable fear
at the time was that other states negotiating their terms of future Union membership
might view Denmark's position as a precedent.56 While Ireland was the only neutral
Member State when the Treaty on European Union was ready for signature, there
were several candidate Member States, like Austria, Finland and Sweden, which
also held a neutral status. In practice, the neutral status of Member States or even
applicant Member States is not a threat to the Union, as any decisions having
defense implications are still handled by the WEU. However, given that the Union
may in the future take a more aggressive role on defense issues, applicant countries
54 Monar, supra note 41, at 413.
55 European Council website, at http://ue.eu.int/en/info/eurocouncil/sommet.htm (last
visited Apr. 18, 2001).
56 Fink-Hooijer, supra note 16, at 196.
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must accept the Treaty on European Union, as amended by the Treaty of Amster-
dan-, in its entirety.
A. The Western European Union
While drafting the Treaty on European Union, the Member States revitalized the
WEU, which had largely disappeared from the international scene during the Cold
War years.' The Treaty refers to the WEU as an integral part of the European Union
because it is charged with implementing the Union's defense related decisions and
actions. It would be through the WEU that the Union would exercise a common
defense, if the European Council and Member States so decided. NATO itself recog-
nized the resurrection of the WEU by declaring in 1994 that it would take measures
to make NATO assets available for WEU operations taken to effectuate the Union's
Common Foreign and Security Policy and that it would seek to improve cooperation
with the WEU 8 Importantly, however, the NATO heads of state also reaffirmed that
NATO would remain the primary organization for addressing and handling security
and defense policies affecting the NATO member countries.
Throughout the 1990s, the WEU continued its comeback. Although the Treaty
of Amsterdam did not culminate in a full merger of the WEU and the Union, it did
strengthen the links between the entities. Article 17 provides that the WEU shall
provide the Union with "access to operational capability" and introduces the
possibility of "integration of the WEU into the Union should the European Council
so decide." No deadline is set, and the language is non-committal, but it does lay
the groundwork for future integration, should political winds blow in that
direction.59 Article 17 also provides for the "progressive framing of a common
defense" which the European Council can recommend that the Member States
adopt in accordance with their constitutional requirements. Notably, Article 17(2)
also extends the scope of the WEU's operational activity to include "humanitarian
and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis manage-
ment" which are known as the "Petersberg tasks." Indeed, even Member States that
are not WEU members may participate in some of the WEU's operational
activities,' a development that could lead to a "de facto merger" of Union and
WEU crisis management mechanisms.6 Given the recent demand for peacekeeping
forces in Europe, this provision could be pivotal in helping the Union to define its
international standing and might. It must be remembered, however, that any use of
57 Founded in 1954, the WEU now includes Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom.
58 Declaration of the Heads of State and Government, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Jan.
10-11, 1994.
59 Monar, supra note 41, at 429.
6 Should the Union utilize the WEU, all Union Member States, even those that are not
WEU members, may fully participate in Union-WEU coordinated action.
61 Monar, supra note 41, at 430.
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WEU military forces requires a unanimous Council decision, which could be
difficult to achieve.
B. New Activity under the Treaty ofAmsterdam
In the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Member States demonstrated a significant
change in collective defense thinking by altering the objectives of the Common
Foreign and Security Policy. The breadth of objectives remains, but the Treaty of
Amsterdam adds that a further objective shall be to safeguard the "integrity of the
Union."62 The significance of this change lies in the word "integrity" which implies
a political commitment to safeguard the Member States' external borders.63 This
is the first reference to a territorial security identity of the Union.' It should also
be noted, however, that the same amendment pared down earlier language by
deleting reference to strengthening the security of the Member States. Under the
Treaty of Amsterdam, the CFSP must aim to strengthen the security of the Union,
not the Member States.6" While the streamlined language can be interpreted as
placing an even stronger emphasis on Union security, it is more appropriately
interpreted as an assertion by some Member States that they do not consider the
Union to be the primary defender of their national security interests.66
Treaty of Amsterdam negotiations also turned Member State attention to
apparent problems with Union decision making under the Second Pillar. The
Member States agreed to rectify the CFSP's reactive decision making history, as
well as its inability to engage in long-term planning. 67 The result was a Declaration
to the Final Act on the establishment of a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit
(PPEWU). 68 The PPEWU will act under the authority of the Secretary General and,
therefore, it will be subject to the Council's administration. Its tasks shall include
monitoring and assessing international developments, assessing the Union's foreign
and security policy interests, detecting early warning of events that may have an
effect on the CFSP and producing policy papers recommending strategies for the
Union's CFSP. 69 If these tasks are met by the PPEWU, it should definitely improve
the Union's informed and effective decision making ability under the CFSP. As in
other areas of the CFSP, the success of the PPEWU is largely dependent on the
political will of the Member States. If the Member States do not accept and support
62 TEU art. 1 I(I), first indent. '
63 Monar, supra note 41, at 415.
64 Id.
65 TEU art. 1(1), second indent.
66 Monar, supra note 41, at 415.
67 Id. at 416.
68 Member States rejected a treaty amendment for fear that the PPEWU would gain great-
er independence and power than intended. See Monar, supra note 41, at 416.
69 CFSP website, supra note 1, § Ill.
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the work of the PPEWU, the PPEWU might not further the Union's efforts to
strengthen the CFSP.7°
C. The European Security and Defense Identity
As the Union treaties evolved and gave shape to the Common Foreign and
Security Policy, the WEU worked on developing a separate, but related, foreign
policy and security vehicle. As early as 1991, before the Maastricht Treaty was
even signed, the WEU member countries announced the need for a true European
Security and Defense Identity so that Europe could have a greater say in global
defense matters.7 The concept of the ESDI did not officially take shape until the
1997 Intergovernmental Conference leading up to the Treaty of Amsterdam where
the WEU ministers announced that the WEU is both integral to the European
Union's development and essential to the development of the ESDI within NATO.
Importantly, NATO supported the development of the ESDI, recognizing that it
could provide greater flexibility to meet the growing variety of NATO missions.72
Furthermore, a solid ESDI could enable Europe to participate more effectively in
NATO operations, even to the extent that it could generate a European military
force to operate under WEU political control and strategic command.73
At the heart of the ESDI is the issue of to what extent the WEU should be a
part of NATO. During the 1997 Intergovernmental Conference, some Union
Member States wanted to fully integrate the WEU in the Union as a means of en-
hancing the Union's international identity while simultaneously providing the
Union with a defense capability.74 Other states, however, strongly opposed such
integration on the grounds that doing so could conflict with the absolute priority
demanded by NATO75 or could interfere with their traditions of neutrality.76 The
United Kingdom, for example, insisted that whatever defense capability Europe
had through the WEU, the WEU should not be incorporated into the Union but
should sit as a separate and independent institution somewhere between the
European Union and NATO.77 As the Treaty of Amsterdam was in its formative
70 Schmalz, supra note 3, at 431; Monar, supra note 41, at 417.
71 The NATO Handbook, (1998), at http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/1988 /v I 06.htm
(last visited Mar. 15, 2001).
72 Id. at v262.htm.
73 Id. at v l06.htm, v262.htm.
74 Benelux, France, Germany, Italy and Spain favored integration. See Monar, supra note
41, at 429.
73 The United Kingdom was particularly concerned with the impact full integration of the
WEU could have on Europe's relationship with NATO. See Monar, supra note 41, at
429.
76 Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden are European Union Member States but are not
NATO members.
7 House of Commons Select Committee on Defense, Third Report, Mar. 31, 1999, [here-
inafter Third Report] 63 at http://parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm/! 998
99/cmselect/cmdfence (last visited Mar. 1, 2001).
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stages, Britain opined that Europe's ability to influence world politics would not
be enhanced by an "unrealistic common defense policy."78
The future of the ESDI remains uncertain. While some view it as a structure on
which to build a European defense capability separate from NATO, others see it as
a means to strengthen the European arm within NATO.79 While the views are
fundamentally at odds with each other, the common theme is how best to project the
Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy on the international stage; i.e., under
or outside the NATO umbrella? As discussed below, the extent Europe should act in
foreign policy and security areas without NATO involvement is disputed.
IV. DECISION MAKING UNDER THE SECOND PILLAR
The effectiveness of any foreign policy depends largely on the actor's ability
to make binding and timely decisions. When more than one actor is involved, the
equation becomes exponentially more complex. In the case of the Union, fifteen
Member States must agree to act, making the process by which it makes its
decisions critical to its ability to act effectively. The Treaty on European Union
devised several means of action, some of which were fortified by the Treaty of
Amsterdam. Overall, the Treaty of Amsterdam amendments place an emphasis on
decision making, rather than on the process of cooperation.8" Article 12 lists the
means by which the Union can pursue its objectives under the CFSP: common
strategies, joint actions and common positions. It replaces former Article JI (3),
which focused on "establishing systematic cooperation" and "gradually imple-
menting" joint actions. While Article 12 clearly shifts the focus to obtaining hard
results, the Second Pillar is still intergovernmental, meaning that the decisions
taken by the Member States under it remain predominantly consensus based.
A. Forms of Decisions
Common positions were the main means of action within the EPC, but under
Article 12, common positions take on a more mandatory flavor. They "define the
approach of the Union to a particular matter of geographical or thematic nature"
and Member States must "ensure that their national policies conform to the
common positions."81 Furthermore, Member States must coordinate their actions
and uphold common positions in international organizations and at international
conferences.82 In effect, common positions are akin to finely tuned versions of the
78 Id.
79 NATO clearly desires that the ESDI enhance its functions only as a subset of NATO.
For further discussion, see the Washington Summit Communiqu6 issued by the Heads
of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in
Washington D.C. on Apr. 24, 1999.
80 Monar, supra note 41, at 415.
S1 TEU art. 15.
82 TEU art. 19.
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principles and guidelines to be adopted by the European Council. 3 Common
decisions have taken the form of sui generis Council decisions, reached by una-
nimity under Article 23."
Joint actions are an important part of the CFSP, and, as amended by the Treaty
of Amsterdam, concern the "operational" action of the Union.85 While the SEA
introduced the idea of joint actions, they were not well-defined or binding
instruments under the EPC. Joint actions are now binding on the Member States.
Once the Council adopts a joint action, the Member States must align their foreign
policy as necessary. In other words, a Member State may not, in principle, take
unilateral action that is incompatible with the tenet of a joint action."' Under the
Treaty on European Union, the Council takes the lead role in effectuating joint
actions 7 based on general policy guidelines issued by the European Council."8 The
Council must decide unanimously that a matter should be the subject of a joint
action. However, the Council may act by qualified majority when adopting a
decision that implements a joint action.89 Except for actions having defense impli-
cations, the Council may not act by qualified majority at all, making the tool of a
joint action inappropriate for defense issues.' The Commission and European
Parliament have no direct role in the final decision making process of a joint action.
Although the Commission has a right of initiative and is to be fully associated with
the work of the CFSP and the Parliament must be consulted and kept informed
about fundamental policy choices in the CFSP, only the Council may adopt a joint
action.9 Joint actions will arise only where there is a political will to do so. How-
ever, given that the initial decision that a joint action is necessary must be unani-
mous, joint actions present a significant contribution to the CFSP, especially when
compared to the non-binding actions taken within the framework of the EPC.
Unlike the decision making methods described above, the Council has a less
direct role in the formation of common strategies, which are a product of the Treaty
of Amsterdam. The European Council decides common strategies on a recommenda-
tion from the Council. The Council then implements common strategies via joint
actions or common positions.' Common strategies are meant to be fairly specific as
illustratedby the requirement that they clearly spell out their "objectives, duration and
83 Monar, supra note 4 1, at 426.
" Neuwahl, supra note 33, at 229.
85 TEU art. 14(1).
86 TEU art. 14 (2, 6, 7).
87 TEU art. 14..
88 TEU arts. 4, 13.
89 TEU art. 23(2).
90 Neuwahl, supra note 33, at 233.
9' TEU arts. 14, 18; Fink-Hooijer, supra note 16, at 182.
92 On June 4, 1999, the Union adopted its first common strategy entitled, "Common
Strategy of the European Union on Russia." The next three scheduled common strate-
gies will cover European Union relations with the Ukraine, the Middle East and the
western Balkahs.
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the means to be made available by the Union and the Member States."93 Such specifi-
city should enable the Union to eliminate the vagueness that plagued earlier CFSP
acts. The Treaty of Amsterdam does not, however, specifically provide that common
strategies shall commit the Member States, which leaves the issue of their binding
nature open to interpretation.94
B. Enforcement
The Union's actions in the Common Foreign and Security Policy will be
effective largely to the extent that the Union is held responsible for its actions and
non-actions. Given that the European Court has practically no jurisdiction over
CFSP matters and that the Union cannot be challenged for failing to act in the
interests of the CFSP objectives, there seems to be little a Member State can do to
challenge the Union for acting either outside the scope of the CFSP or for having
failed to act where it should have furthered CFSP objectives. Similarly, because
internal CFSP matters are outside the European Court's jurisdiction, the Union
cannot sue a Member State for failing to support the CFSP.9'
Under the CFSP, the basic method of enforcement is political pressure,' as the
Council must ensure that the Member States comply with the objectives of the
CFSP.97 Because the European Council is the highest political body of the Union, it
also can use political pressure on errant Member States to support Union objectives.
Additionally, under Article 11(2), the Member States are obliged to "support the
Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty
and mutual solidarity." There are several other treaty provisions that oblige Member
States to implement CFSP decisions.9" Admittedly, however, there is no provision
stating that legal action can be taken against a Member State that does not comply
with a CFSP provision, a matter that could prove to be especially volatile depending
on the political sway of the disobedient Member State.
C. Voting
It was hoped during the June 1997 Intergovernmental Conference that the
Treaty of Amsterdam would improve decision making procedures in the CFSP
area. The procedural requirements, specifically voting requirements, necessary for
decisions are crucial to decision making capacity generally. As mentioned above,
the traditional unanimity requirement for CFSP action is identified as a key cause
93 TEU art. 13.
94 Monar, supra note 41, at 426.
95 Eaton, supra note 19, at 221.
96 Id.
97 TEU art. 11(2).
98 See, e.g., TEU art. 14.
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of delay in the decision making process which often leads to reduced substance in
decisions, or worse, no decision at all."
During the Intergovernmental Conference there were two opposing camps:
those who favored majority voting"° and those who favored continued unanimous
decision making.'' The much-debated merits of majority voting, such as increased
efficiency, were viewed as insufficient benefits when the topic was a matter of
foreign policy, as opposed to one of economic policy under the European Com-
munity Treaty. Some argue that a foreign policy decision adopted against the will
of a Member State could lose international credibility and be undermined by sig-
nals from the opposing Member State through diplomatic channels.'0 2 Proponents
of majority voting argue that this risk, to the extent that it cannot be controlled
through political pressure and loyalty clauses,' °3 is a necessary reality if the Union
is serious about having an effective Common Foreign and Security Policy that is
respected on the international stage. Furthermore, if important CFSP decisions
could be taken by a majority vote, dissenting Member States would be highly
motivated to compromise with the majority to have some of their concerns
addressed rather than risk being outvoted all together.'
In the end, as is reflected by the Treaty of Amsterdam, the opposing camps
compromised by retaining unanimous voting, with two exceptions: constructive
abstention and limited use of qualified majority voting.0 5 Where a decision must
be unanimous, a Member State's abstention will not prevent the adoption of the
Council's decision to act. If the Member State's abstention is "qualified," then the
Member State is not obliged to apply the decision, but must accept that it binds the
Union. In other words, the Member State may not take any action that could
conflict with or hinder the Union's intended action. As a protection to minority
dissenting Member States, Article 23(1) provides further that a decision cannot
pass if Member States qualifying their abstention represent more than one-third of
the votes under the Community qualified majority rules. While this constructive
abstention exception was designed to reduce the rigidity of unanimous voting, it
could be counterproductive to the Union's desire to achieve a unified foreign and
security policy. In effect, this provision allows a Member State to disassociate itself
formally from a Union act, thus creating an "automatic opt-out possibility" "° which
would directly undermine the "spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity" principle of
Article 11(2).
9 Monar, supra note 4 1, at 418.
'a Germany, Benelux, Italy and Austria favored increased majority voting. See Schmalz,
supra note 3, 432.
101 The United Kingdom, Portugal and Greece favored maintenance of unanimity. See
Schmalz, id.
Monar, supra note 41, at 418.
103 TEU art. 11(2).
1o4 Monar, supra note 41, at 418.
'0 TEU art. 23.-
106 Monar, supra note 41, at 419.
2001]
HeinOnline  -- 7 U. C. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 185 2001
University of California, Davis
As the second exception to the unanimity requirement, Article 23(2) provides
that the Council shall act by qualified majority voting "when adopting joint actions,
common positions or taking any other decision on the basis of a common strategy"
and "when adopting any decision implementing a joint action or common position."
While apparently a considerable improvement, this exception to the unanimity rule
is heavily qualified. Because the European Council decides common strategies, as
well as their objectives, duration and means for their achievement, the decisions taken
by the Council are likely to be mere implementing measures. 7 As with the Treaty on
European Union, the amendments of the Treaty of Amsterdam ensure that basic,
important decisions are still reached, effectively, by unanimity through the work of
the European Council. This requirement of majority voting is likely to thrust the level
of substantive decision making upwards to the European Council.'08
As a further qualification to when unanimity is not required, Article 23(2)
provides that a Member State may actually prevent any decision being adopted if
it opposes a decision being taken by qualified majority for reasons of national
policy. In such a case, however, the Council may act by qualified majority and
refer the matter to the European Council, which can override the dissenting Mem-
ber State by a unanimous vote."° Additionally, the necessary qualified majority is
actually a double qualified majority, as there must be both a "Community" quali-
fied majority and a majority of at least 10 out of 15 Member States." Lastly, and
perhaps most importantly, the qualified majority voting provisions do not apply to
defense or military decisions. By flatly refusing to accept majority voting on these
issues, the Member States signify their insistence on unqualified sovereignty over
national security.
Whether the Treaty of Amsterdam amendments on voting procedures will
constitute a major improvement in CFSP development remains to be seen. With
more decisions taken by qualified majority voting, the system will, at a minimum,
be more efficient. At a maximum, dissenting Member States could be pressured to
compromise for the sake of CFSP unity. But, because there are so many qualifi-
cations on the Treaty of Amsterdam's attempted improvements to the decision
making procedures, the actual improvement to the Union's CFSP decision making
capacity is likely to be marginal."'
D. Treaty Making
Treaty making capability is a critical demonstration of effective international
action. It is an aspect of decision making that has also been affected by the Treaty of
Amsterdam, as the amendments made some attempt to rectify the Union's lack of
treaty making ability. If the Union is determined to speak with one voice on foreign
107 Id.
1o Schmalz, supra note 3, at 432.
'09 TEU art. 23(2).
11 Schmalz, supra note 3, at 432; Monar, supra note 41, at 421.
... Schmalz, supra note 3, at 432.
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affairs, then it must have some method by which to reach binding agreements with
third countries. Under the Treaty on European Union, there is no provision for the
Union, as distinct from the Community, to conclude international agreements, nor is
there a provision specifically granting the Union legal personality."2
During the 1997 Intergovernmental Conference, the Member States were split
on whether to grant the Union legal personality and, hence, treaty making power. "3
While it was agreed that the Union's visibility and effectiveness would increase if
it had legal personality, some Member States were concerned that granting the
Union legal personality and treaty making capacity would further threaten their
sovereignty."" Article 24 is the resulting compromise which provides that in order
to conclude an international agreement to implement a CFSP measure, the Council
may, acting unanimously, authorize the Presidency to open negotiations. The
Commission may assist the Presidency where necessary. The Council, again acting
unanimously and on recommendation from the Presidency, must conclude the
agreement. The binding effect on each Member States is subject to national
ratification procedures. "3 However, the Union still lacks legal personality, meaning
that the Member States or the Community (or both via a mixed agreement) are the
ultimate contracting parties with a third state." 6 The result of the Article 24
compromise is that there is now more practical ability for the Union to engage in
treaty making. But without legal personality, the Union suffers from a lack of
international standing, and possibly credibility, in the eyes of third countries." 7
E. Financing
Even if the Union does begin to make decisions efficiently and effectively, it
will be of no consequence if subsequent decisions to finance the measures are
stalled. Under the Treaty on European Union, inadequate and seriously delayed
financing of CFSP actions spurred friction between the Council, Commission and
European Parliament on questions of budgetary powers and procedures." 8
Furthermore, Member States often failed to adequately finance joint actions from
their national budgets.' Infighting and delay only further injure the Union's
112 Contrary to the prevailing view, one scholar argues that the Union does have legal
personality, according to criteria established under international law. See Ramses A.
Wessel, The International Legal Status of the European Union, 2 EFA REV 109
(1997). See also Cremona, supra note 11, at 250-251; Nanette Neuwahl, A Partner
with a Troubled Personality: EU Treaty-Making in Matters of CFSP and JHA After
Amsterdam, EFA REv. 177, 178-86 (1998).
... France, Denmark and the United Kingdom were opposed to the proposition. See
Schmalz, supra note 3, at 434.
'. Id. See also Neuwahl, supra note 111, at 185.
"' TEU art. 24.
116 Neuwahl, supra note 33, at 237; Cremona, supra note 11, at 25 1.
17 Schmalz, supra note 3, at 434-35; Monar, supra note 41, at 427.
H Monar, supra note 41, at 429; Schmalz, supra note 3, at 429.
19 Monar, supra note 41, at 429.
2001]
HeinOnline  -- 7 U. C. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 187 2001
University of California, Davis
international reputation. Article 28(3) of the Treaty of Amsterdam removes the
option and now clearly states that operational expenses for the implementation of
Common Foreign and Security Policy measures must be charged to the European
Communities budget. 2 Military and defense operations are exempted, and the
Council may decide unanimously to alter financing for CFSP measures. As a final
precaution, the European Parliament, Council and Commission have reached an
inter-institutional agreement to regulate budgetary procedures between them.'
This agreement should reduce, if not eliminate, conflicts over procedure between
the institutions and thereby ensure increased coherence between the activities of the
institutions in the area of the CFSP.
F. Unfair Criticism?
Critics of the Common Foreign and Security Policy cite the Union's general
requirement for unanimous decision making as the central fault of the CFSP. The
assumption is that if decisions must be unanimous, the Union cannot act effectively
or efficiently on the international foreign affairs stage, especially considering that
the qualified majority exception does not apply to decisions having defense impli-
cations. Precedent, however, does not support this criticism. The next section will
address the decision making structure of an even larger, older and more effective
international organization: NATO.
V. DECISION MAKING UNDER NATO
NATO acts by consensus. The main decision making body is the North Atlan-
tic Council, which is composed of ambassadors or permanent representatives of all
the NATO member countries. Whether the North Atlantic Council is composed of
diplomats, foreign ministers or heads of government, its decision making powers
remain constant, retaining the same validity and effect regardless of who represents
the member countries. Through the North Atlantic Council, the member countries
discuss issues, share information and express their views before arriving at a
consensual decision.'22 All votes must be unanimous, without exception. Because
each member country has an equal say in the decisions, each has an equal
responsibility for the resulting policies. The routine exchange of ideas and lengthy
consultations ensure that no action is taken without the approval of each NATO
member country.
The North Atlantic Council acts as an umbrella committee that oversees the
work of numerous subcommittees which address specific policy issues. The De-
fense Planning Committee, for example, deals primarily with collective defense
20 TEU art. 28. Before the Treaty of Amsterdam, administrative expenses were to be
charged to the Community budget, while operational expenses were charged either to
the Member States or the Community budget, as decided unanimously by the Council.
121 Schmalz, supra note 3, at 430; Monar, supra note 41, at 429.
122 NATO Handbook, supra note 71, at v006.htm.
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issues.'" Each NATO member is represented on each subcommittee and, as with
the North Atlantic Council, each subcommittee takes decisions only by unanimity.
The expansive committee structure is designed to allow each NATO member
country to participate in all areas of NATO activity, at all levels.""
An effective alliance of independent states depends on the goodwill of each
member country to regularly apprise the other members of its national policies that
might affect the alliance as a whole. To this end, NATO has always encouraged
regular political consultation among its members before pertinent national deci-
sions are taken. 25 Whether an individual member country is making policy within
or outside the NATO Treaty area, political consultation through the North Atlantic
Council is appropriate if it has strategic implications for the Alliance. Member
countries exchange information and opinions and disclose plans for national
operations that could affect the interests of other member countries, all with the
goal of ensuring that national policies complement, or at least do not hinder, NATO
policy."2 Regular political consultation allows the NATO member countries to
recognize areas that are appropriate for timely NATO action. 27 Without political
consultation, NATO would not be able to respond quickly and take appropriate
action in urgent situations with the acquiescence of all the member countries. The
constant flow of information is at the root of decisive and swift action by
consensus, as each member country is aware of the potential need for NATO action
long before it is necessary.
The NATO members chose to make all decisions by consensus. In the wealth
of literature on NATO, there is little mention of logistical problems due to NATO's
unanimous voting requirement. Unlike the European Union's Common Foreign
and Security Policy, there is no exception to unanimity; majority voting is never
an option. Unanimous decision making runs throughout the NATO structure,
whether it is a decision of the North Atlantic Council or a subcommittee. One
could, however, argue that a consensus reached around the North Atlantic Council
table is really no more than an expression of what the United States of America has
subtly, or even not so subtly, dictated. Perhaps less powerful NATO members
simply surrender under the pressure of the majority's wish. Perhaps political
persuasion is the true driving force behind consensus decision making in NATO.
For example, while the Greek government publicly expressed reservations about
NATO bombing the former Yugoslavia in 1998 and 1999, it never actually voted
against undertaking or continuing the military operations there. Whatever the
reason, NATO decision making is effective and efficient, without much complaint
from any of the nineteen member countries.
'" France is the only NATO member country that is not represented on the Defense
Planning Committee. In 1966, France withdrew from NATO's integrated military
structure, but it has always participated in the political structure.
',' NATO Handbook, supra note 71, at 009.htm.
's Id. at vI06.htm.
126 Id.
127 Id.
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Are European Union decisions under the Second Pillar really any different
than NATO decisions? Is the criticism of the CFSP decision making process
justified? While NATO is often under attack for a huge variety of political reasons,
its decision making structure is, essentially, a non-issue. Why, then, do critics
assume that, because the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy must be
executed by consensus, it cannot be effective? The CFSP decision making process
is more flexible than NATO's in that it allows for majority voting in two instances,
as discussed above. Both alliances chose unanimity as the mainstay of their
decision making processes because defense is paramount to sovereign nations. No
nation wants to be told by another nation that it may, may not, or must go to war.12 8
Because foreign policy and security are at the heart of a nation's sovereignty,
consensus ensures that no action will be taken which threatens that truism.
VI. THE DIRECTION OF THE CFSP
Europe's role in NATO is clearly changing, as is NATO's role in the world at
large. Europe is taking positive steps to effectuate these expected changes, some
of which are occurring within the construct of the European Union's CFSP. As the
Common Foreign and Security Policy develops, Europe's changing role within
NATO will become more apparent.
Through its Common Foreign and Security Policy, the European Union ex-
presses bold goals, including safeguarding the independence of the Union and
strengthening the security of the Union and its Member States. As the Union
develops in this regard, third countries will develop perceptions of what the Union
is and what it can achieve through the CFSP. NATO cites similar principles as the
basis, for collective security, namely political solidarity among the member
countries, collaboration in areas of common interest, the sharing of responsibility
and commitment, and the maintenance of a military force sufficient to support its
policy and strategy.'29 Military capability and the commitment of each member
country to act collectively and decisively in the pursuit of common .defense are
clearly the main components of NATO's success, as they guarantee the security
and integrity of each member country.
A. Realistic Goals?
The question remains as to whether the European Union enjoys the same
capability and commitment as NATO, or whether it suffers from a capability-
128 The lessons of Denmark illustrate this point. In two referenda on whether Denmark
should sign the Treaty on European Union, the Danish public made clear that they
would not allow a third country to dictate when Danish youth would be called to fight
for another country, or even Europe as a whole.
.29 NATO Handbook, supra note 71, at v l08.htm.
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expectation gap.3 ° Or, phrased differently, can the Union live up to the image it
hopes to project internationally? After the Treaty of European Union introduced
the Common Foreign and Security Policy, there was real concern as to whether the
Union had the capability to meet its intended goals. 3' The Union's anticipated
inability to make binding decisions effectively and its lack of coordinated military
power were cited as the main contributors to the gap that existed between the
Union's capabilities and the expectations demanded of the Union through its
Common Foreign and Security Policy.'32 For the situation to improve, it was
suggested that capabilities increase or expectations lower.'33 In other words, the
Union would either have to revamp its decision making process and build an
effectiye military force and command structure, or it would have to scale back its
foreign policy goals and revise the image it portrays to third countries. In the seven
years since the Treaty on European Union came into effect, has the assumed gap
between the Union's capability and outside expectations narrowed?
The important changes introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam provide a
promising base on which real changes to the Union's Common Foreign and
Security Policy can occur. Before the Amsterdam amendments, the Union had only
limited means to effectuate its Common Foreign and Security Policy, rendering it
more of a "hollow shell" than an effective foreign policy instrument. 34 One of the
most important additions to the Common Foreign and Security Policy is the office
of the High Representative of the European Union for the Common Foreign and
Security Policy. Since his appointment as High Representative on October 18,
1999, Javier Solana has highlighted the need for efficient decision making capa-
bilities if the Union is to develop an active foreign policy, including an effective
policy on security and defense. 3 '
As the study of NATO's decision making structure shows, a collective body
of states can make decisions effectively, even when acting only by consensus.
While this is by no means an assurance that the Union's Common Foreign and
Security Policy will be as effective as NATO policy, it does mean that it is possible
for the Union to act by consensus and be a major player in the field of global
security and foreign policy. However, even assuming that the Union has the
practical ability to wield influence with its current decision making structure, there
is another potential roadblock to Union action on defense issues: will NATO allow
the Union to take the decisions necessary for the Union to enhance the visibility
and credibility of its Common Foreign and Security Policy? The practical issue
130 Christopher Hill, The Capability-Expectations Gap, or ConceptualizingEurope's Inter-
national Role, 31 JCMS 305 (1993).
,' Id. at 315.
112 Id. at 316, 318.
11 Id. at 321.
134 Solana, supra note 2.
'3' Dr. Javier Solana, Remarks to the Press, Brussels, (Oct. 18, 1999), Nr: 4500/3/99, at
http://ue.eu.int/newsroom (last visited Apr. 20, 2001).
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addresses the question of whether the Union can make decisions effectively under
the Second Pillar. The political question is, will NATO permit such independence?
B. Nascent Parameters
Recently the European Union has made positive efforts to define the para-
meters in which it intends its Common Foreign and Security Policy to operate. At
its June 1999 Summit in Cologne, the European Council recommended the
development of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). ESDP is
essentially a specific application of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and
part of the progressive framing of a common defense policy, as spelled out in
Article 17 of the Treaty on European Union. The core idea of the ESDP is that the
European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy can be successful only to
the extent that it is reinforced by a solid military capability. 36 The European
Council specifically intended to grant the Council the means to implement the
whole range of the Petersberg tasks'37 as the European Council perceived a real
need for Europe to take more responsibility for regional and global security.
Indeed, the capacity to use force is deemed an "essential component of a credible
foreign policy."138 With a more effective Common Foreign and Security Policy, the
Union should be better able to affect international security and prosperity.'39
In December 1999 in Helsinki, the European Council fleshed out the idea for
an increased Union military capability introduced at the Cologne Summit. 4 As the
starting point to its new European Security and Defense Policy, the European
Council announced first that by 2003 the Union should develop the ability to
deploy up to 60,000 troops to intervene in humanitarian crises with less than 60
days notice, and have the ability to sustain those troops for at least a year. This
operational capacity must be accompanied by simultaneous development of com-
mand, control and support capabilities as well as basic support services. Second,
the European Council decided to establish permanent political and military bodies,
such as a Military Committee, in the Council to manage military operations on a
daily basis, ensure quick decision making and provide accountability for military
operations. Any decision making process within the ESDP must be flexible and
short so that decisions can be taken quickly when necessary."'4 Third, the European
136 European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on
Security and Defense, Annex III to the Presidency Conclusions to the Cologne Euro-
pean Council, June 3-4 1999 [hereinafter Cologne European Council Declaration],
para. I.
17 Id.
3 Dr. Javier Solana, Speech to the Munich Conference on Security Policy, Munich, (Feb.
5, 2000), available at http://ue.eu.int/newsroom (last visited Apr. 24, 2001).
9 Solana, supra note 2.
140 Presidency Conclusions from the Helsinki European Council Summit, Dec. 10-11,
1999.
141 Solana, supra note 2.
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Council stressed the need for frequent and transparent consultation and cooperation
with NATO and non-Union countries. Without the active support of its allies,
neighbors and the WEU, the ESDP could fail before it even stretches its wings. As
some or all of the Helsinki objectives could necessitate Union treaty amendment,
the European Council has provided that the Union establish interim bodies to begin
the process of forming the ESDP. The clear hope is that the above developments
will enable the Union to assume an increased responsibility for a broader range of
conflict prevention, crisis management tasks, peacekeeping functions and humani-
tarian and rescue missions. 42
As the Union announced in Cologne and Helsinki its intentions to develop a
European Security and Defense Policy with autonomous decision making ability,
two major concerns arose from the international sector. First, some perceived the
Union's plans as an attempt to militarize Europe by creating a European army.
41
The Union has been quick to shoot down such perceptions, assuring the inter-
national community that the ESDP is not a vehicle for collective defense, as that
function remains with NATO only, and that it does not affect the rights of Member
States to maintain their own defense policies." The 60,000 troops for crisis
management operations will be the product of improving and reorganizing existing
national and multinational forces. 45 Second, the United States has kept a watchful
eye on just how much autonomy the Union intends to afford itself in areas of
international security. The CFSP's High Representative has repeatedly assured the
international community, and specifically the United States, that the Union will
lead military operations only in situations where NATO is not involved and that a
European Security and Defense Policy is not an attempt to undermine NATO.' 4
C. A Nervous Parent
The United States has repeatedly claimed that it supports the development of the
European Security and Defense Identity. The United States views the ESDI not as a
competitor of NATO, but rather as a complement to it. At the NATO Washington
Summit in April 1999, the parties proclaimed that a European Security and Defense
Policy would not only be compatible with the NATO Treaty, but would benefit the
142 Dr. Javier Solana, Speech to the Danish Institute of International Affairs on The
Development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Role of the High Rep-
resentative," Copenhagen, Feb. 11, 2000, available at http://ue.eu.int/newsroom (last
visited Apr. 24, 2001).
143 Solana, supra note 2.
'" Id. Cologne European Council Declaration, supra note 135, at para. 5.
14S Solana, supranotes 137,141; CologneEuropean CouncilDeclaration,supra note 135,
at para. 2.
'" See Dr. Javier Solana, Speech to the Foreign Policy Association, New York, Jan. 25,
2000; Solana, supra note 2.
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Alliance generally.'47 Additionally, the NATO countries specifically reaffirmed their
commitments to reinforcing the European pillar of NATO.'48 The American position
on this issue has not changed. The United States has encouraged Europe to take a
more proactive role in quelling regional conflicts and, therefore, knows that the Union
must develop a military capability if it is to achieve this goal. 49 However, Union
assurances that Union-led military operations will occur only where NATO as a
whole is not engaged do not assuage American concerns given that the issue of
"sequencing""50 remains vague. Specifically, the United States does not want Europe
to decide independently when it will exercise its own military capability. The se-
quence of decision making will determine how the balance of power swings between
the European Union and NATO.
Because Javier Solana is the spokesperson for the European Union's Common
Foreign and Security Policy, his words shed light on the extent of strategic decision
making power the Union intends to assert. Amid assurances that the Union will lead
military operations only where NATO is not engaged, Solana also states that "there
will be occasions when we [the European Union and NATO] agree between us that
Europe should take the lead" and, more directly to the point, that "[t]he decision to
launch operations has to be a decision for the fifteen [Member States].''. While
official Union proclamations do not state explicitly that the Union alone will decide
when it leads a collective military operation, the conclusions from the recent Euro-
pean Council Summits are ominously vague as to where initial and ultimate decision
making power to launch a Union-only operation should lie.
Such uncertainty over decision making authority, especially in light of Javier
Solana's comments, makes the United States, as a leading force in NATO, uncom-
fortable given the access to military forces NATO has promised to the European
Union. At the April 1999 NATO Summit, the countries outlined the steps necessary
to make the European Security and Defense Identity a reality by promoting the
European Security and Defense Policy. NATO has undertaken the task of insti-
tuting arrangements for the European Union to have "presumed," "assured" and
"ready" access to NATO assets in the event of military operations "in which the
Alliance as whole is not engaged militarily. as an Alliance."' 52 Shortly after the
NATO Summit, the European Union announced at the Cologne and Helsinki Sum-
mits its intention to develop an autonomous security and defense policy. At the
Cologne Summit, the European Council stated that, "the European Union will have
to determine, according to the requirements of the case, whether it will conduct
EU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities."
147 Washington Summit Communiqu6, North Atlantic Council Meeting, Washington D.C.,
Apr. 24, 1999.
148 Id.
14' Declaration of the European Union and the United States of America, Bonn, Jun. 21
1999, at http://ue.eu.int/newsroom (last visited Apr. 27, 2001).
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The Union's emphasis on autonomy alarmed the United States which insisted
that, because NATO troops will be available to Union-only military operations,
NATO should effectively have a "right of first refusal" over potential military
operations; i.e., discussion about any European Union military operation must begin
at the NATO level.' In Helsinki, the European Council repeated its determination
to develop an "autonomous" decision making capacity over military operations, but
also stated that "[t]he development of the common European policy on security and
defense will take place without prejudice to the commitments under Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty."'' This seems to imply that perhaps NATO will have an
understood right of first refusal to take military action it deems necessary for
protecting the interests of the Alliance members. However, throughout the Helsinki
Summit, the European Council repeatedly asserted that the Union has "autonomous
capacity to take decisions ... to launch and then to conduct Union-led military
operations."' 55 With each assertion of unbridled independence, the caveat of "where
NATO as a whole is not engaged" grows less reassuring to the United States.
Europe seems to be in agreement that it should have an increased defense
capability to implement the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy. The
United States, wearing its NATO hat, has generally supported Europe's intentions
to gain military capability through the ESDI and ESDP, even to the extent of
making NATO assets available for WEU-Ied operations."5 But, like a nervous
parent, it does not want to relinquish control altogether. In the eyes of the United
States, military capability should not evolve into a military independence that pro-
vides the basis for a European-only alliance, as this would not be in the security
interest of Europe or the United States. 5
CONCLUSION
The critics of the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy
commonly argue that the Union cannot be an effective international actor because
Second Pillar decisions require unanimity as a general rule. However, as NATO's
practice demonstrates, the requirement of unanimity is not fatal to effective decision
making. Indeed, one could argue that unanimous decision making diffuses any threat
to a nation's sovereignty occasioned by engaging in a collective defense arrangement.
Despite the desire of the Member States to have a foreign policy that rivals the
success of its economic policies, the future of the European Union's Common
Foreign and Security Policy is far from certain. The capability-expectations gap,
which threatened the CFSP at its inception, still exists today, but for different rea-
sons. It is not the practical requirement of unanimous decision making that will
153 LONDON TIMES, supra note 149.
i Presidency Progress Report to the Helsinki European Council on Strengthening the
Common European Policy on Security and Defense, Dec. 8, 1999, at para. 6.
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156 Third Report, supra note 76, at annex B, para. 18.
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undermine the ability of the Union to meet internal and external expectations.
Rather, the political relationship of the Union with NATO is more likely to thwart
Union efforts to be a truly independent actor in international affairs. American
insistence that NATO have a right of first refusal over the Union's potential mili-
tary operations will effectively put the Union's Common Foreign and Security Poli-
cy on a NATO leash. In effect, American foreign policy is an extra-institutional
component of CFSP activity. All aspects of the Union's foreign and security policy,
whether it is the much-touted European Security and Defense Identity, the new
European Security and Defense Policy, or the Common Foreign and Security
Policy generally, will exist only under the shadow of NATO, or more precisely, the
United States.
The CFSP is still relatively young. While it searches for its own place on the
international stage, third countries, like the United States, will also consider
appropriate applications of the CFSP. The United States agrees that there will be
occasions when Europe alone should undertake collective military action to defend
its borders and values. Therefore, the European Union will have the opportunity to
be an effective international actor, even if it must do so beneath the American
shadow. The question for the future is whether the American shadow will fade if
the European Union demonstrates that its Common Foreign and Security Policy is
not only credible, but also influential in shaping global security policy.
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